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The Paper Trail of Knowledge Spillovers: 
Evidence from Patent Interferences†
By Ina Ganguli, Jeffrey Lin, and Nicholas Reynolds*
We show evidence of localized knowledge spillovers using a new data-
base of US patent interferences terminated between 1998 and 2014. 
Interferences resulted when two or more independent parties submit-
ted identical claims of invention nearly simultaneously. Following the 
idea that inventors of identical inventions share common knowledge 
inputs, interferences provide a new method for measuring knowledge 
spillovers. Interfering inventors are 1.4 to 4.0 times more likely to 
live in the same local area than matched control pairs of inventors. 
They are also more geographically concentrated than  citation-linked 
inventors. Our results emphasize geographic distance as a barrier to 
tacit knowledge flows. (JEL D83, O31, O33, O34)
Why is innovative activity geographically clustered (Carlino and Kerr 2015, Lin 2011)? One intriguing hypothesis is that inventors benefit from localized 
knowledge spillovers. Agglomeration may increase the frequency of interactions and 
the spread of knowledge, especially tacit or  difficult-to-codify knowledge (Marshall 
1920, Glaeser 1999, Feldman 2000, Ganguli 2015). The identification of localized 
knowledge spillovers faces at least two challenges. One, knowledge spillovers are 
hard to measure: “They leave no paper trail by which they may be measured or 
tracked” (Krugman 1991). Two, different theories of agglomeration are “observa-
tionally equivalent,” i.e., they yield similar predictions for measured productivity, 
wages, or other aggregates (Duranton and Puga 2004, Audretsch and Feldman 2004).
To address these two challenges, we construct a novel database of patent inter-
ferences. Patent interferences measure (nearly) simultaneous instances of identical 
invention by two or more independent parties. Under the “first to invent” rule prevail-
ing in the United States until 2013, the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
investigated independent, simultaneous, and identical claims of invention in a patent 
* Ganguli: Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 412 N. Pleasant Street, Amherst, 
MA 01002 (email: iganguli@econs.umass.edu); Lin: Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
Ten Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 191064 (email: jeff.lin@phil.frb.org); Reynolds: Department of 
Economics and Population Studies and Training Center, Brown University, Box B, Providence, RI 02912 (email: 
nicholas_reynolds@brown.edu). David Deming was coeditor for this article. We thank Marcus Berliant, Jerry 
Carlino, Bob Hunt, John Stevens, and conference and workshop participants at the Urban Economics Association, 
the Federal Reserve System Committee on Regional Analysis, the NBER Productivity Workshop, EFPL Lausanne, 
the HBS Entrepreneurial Management Seminar, the CID Growth Lab, George Washington University, and the 
Twelfth Annual Conference on Innovation Economics at Northwestern for comments and suggestions, and we 
thank Aaron Rosenbaum for excellent research assistance.
† Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180017 to visit the article page for additional materials and author 
disclosure statement(s) or to comment in the online discussion forum.
VOL. 12 NO. 2 279GANGULI ET AL.: THE PAPER TRAIL OF KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS
interference. The inventor who conceived and reduced to practice first was awarded 
patent protection. (This system contrasts with the “first to file” rule more common 
in the rest of the world and prevailing in the United States today. Under “first to 
file,” the inventor who files first wins the patent.) Famously, simultaneous claims by 
Alexander Graham Bell and Elisha Gray in February 1876 provoked an interference 
over the telephone patent.
By recording instances of common invention, patent interferences create a unique 
record of common knowledge inputs. Historians of science have noted the fre-
quency of simultaneous, independent discovery, which Merton (1973) called “mul-
tiples”—e.g., the independent invention of calculus by Newton and Leibniz, or the 
independent formulation of the theory of natural selection by Darwin and Wallace. 
The view that new ideas result from combinations of existing ideas (Weitzman 1998) 
suggests that interfering inventors share similar existing knowledge. For example, 
interfering inventors may have a similar background in chemistry, or they may have 
similar information about market conditions. Consider Gladwell’s (2008) descrip-
tion of Bell’s and Gray’s invention of the telephone: “They arrived at electric speech 
by more or less the same pathway. They were trying to find a way to send more than 
one message at a time along a telegraph wire—which was then one of the central 
technological problems of the day. They had read the same essential sources—par-
ticularly the work of Phillipp Reis, the German physicist who had come startlingly 
close to building a working telephone back in the early  eighteen-sixties.”
We use interferences to test the hypothesis that geographically proximate inven-
tors are more likely to share common knowledge inputs. The commonplace nature 
of multiples has led some to speculate that they must be “in the air, products of the 
intellectual climate of a specific time and place” (Gladwell 2008, our emphasis). If 
knowledge spillovers are geographically localized, then a pair of neighboring inven-
tors will have access to the same input knowledge. If they have access to the same 
input knowledge, they may be more likely to use it successfully in the same way, 
provoking a localized interference. However, if access to required knowledge inputs 
is unaffected by distance, then interference would be as likely between neighboring 
inventors as between distant inventors.
We show that interfering inventor pairs tend to be geographically concentrated, 
suggesting that neighboring inventors are more likely to share common knowledge 
inputs. Central to identification is whether the  colocation of interfering inventors can 
be attributed to localized knowledge spillovers or to some other factor. For exam-
ple, inventors may  colocate to take advantage of thick markets for specialized skills 
(Bleakley and Lin 2012), or they may  colocate to share a fixed,  nontraded physical 
input (Helmers and Overman 2017). To deal with the problem of inference under 
multiple sources of agglomeration economies, we use a matched control approach 
following Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993). For each interfering pair of 
inventors, we create a control pair by matching an interfering patent or application 
with a control patent selected on technology class and the date of invention. The con-
trol pair represents the expected proximity of inventors working in the same field and 
time period, except not conditioned on a “knowledge spillover” (i.e., an interference).
We find that interfering inventor pairs are 1.4 to 4.0 times more likely to live in 
the same local area—a place, city, or region—compared with control inventor pairs. 
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Identification relies on (i) interfering inventors sharing common knowledge inputs 
and (ii) matching on observables fully accounting for other factors besides localized 
knowledge spillovers affecting the geography of invention. We show that our results 
are robust to conditioning on additional controls. Further, as Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
and Henderson (1993) notes, to the extent that control pairs also  colocate to take 
advantage of knowledge spillovers, we will tend to  underestimate the importance 
of localized knowledge spillovers. In addition, we avoid scale and border problems 
by using  distance-based tests of localization instead of aggregating inventors to 
administrative spatial units of arbitrary size (e.g., cities or counties) (Duranton and 
Overman 2005). For example, measuring  colocation at the county or commuting 
zone level understates localization if inventors are clustered on opposite sides of a 
county boundary. Murata et al. (2014) shows that downward bias from scale and 
border problems is large relative to the upward bias from imperfect matching as 
emphasized in Thompson (2006) and Thompson and  Fox-Kean (2005).
Interfering inventor pairs are also more geographically concentrated compared 
with  citation-linked inventors. Pairs of  cited–citing inventors may provide an even 
closer match compared with matching only on other observables. The localiza-
tion of interfering inventors compared with  citation-linked inventors—who likely 
share codified knowledge—points to the important role of geographic proximity in 
facilitating flows of tacit, or hard-to-codify, knowledge. We also analyze the role 
of previous  coinventor ties in mediating the relationship between localization and 
interference. Inventors may be linked by a social network defined by inventors who 
have previously been listed as  coinventors on a patent. Inventor pairs linked by pre-
vious  coinventor ties are more likely to interfere with each other compared with 
inventor pairs not linked by previous  coinventor ties. However, in contrast to evi-
dence from Breschi and Lissoni (2005) and Head, Li, and Minondo (forthcoming), 
we find little evidence that  coinventor ties are an important channel for the localiza-
tion of interferences. 
Our approach departs from existing ones that use the “paper trail” of patent cita-
tions to identify localized knowledge spillovers. In principle, a patent citation mea-
sures a piece of existing knowledge upon which the new patent builds. Earlier work 
has noted that citations are a “noisy” signal of knowledge spillovers. A survey of 
patenting inventors in Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Fogarty (2000) reported that “ one-half 
of all citations do not correspond to any spillover,” and Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and 
Henderson (1993) acknowledged that “an enormous number of spillovers [occur] 
with no citation.” 1 Our contribution is to focus on identical inventive output. Thus, 
we circumvent the requirement of exactly measuring flows of knowledge across 
inventors using citations as measures of inputs.2 Instead, our view is that identical 
invention likely requires a broad range of shared knowledge inputs. Citations may 
capture some of these shared knowledge inputs. But many knowledge inputs are not 
1 Inventors strategically not citing known prior art contribute to this problem.
2 Further, compared with earlier efforts to measure multiples (Ogburn and Thomas 1922, Bikard 2012), our 
database is large and relies on the  real-time declaration of multiples by patent examiners instead of ex post measure-
ment by researchers. A contemporaneous paper, Baruffaldi and Raffo (2017), uses citations classified by European 
Patent Office examiners as showing the claimed invention is not novel to construct a database of duplicated inven-
tions. In contrast, interferences seem likely to measure duplication beyond cited prior art.
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measured by citations—because they are not patentable and therefore not citable, 
or perhaps because they are tacit. Thus, interferences may better capture spillovers 
of tacit knowledge, or at least knowledge that is not measured by a patent citation.3
Second, a common interpretation of a citation is that knowledge has “spilled 
over” from the cited inventor to the citing inventor. Our setting is more agnostic: 
it doesn’t matter where input knowledge originates. It might have been discovered 
by an interfering inventor, or it may have been discovered by a friend or colleague 
(or a more passing connection) of an interfering inventor. The key idea is that the 
accessibility of knowledge varies across space, so that  colocated inventors are more 
likely compared with distant inventors to share the same knowledge.4
I. Identifying Localized Knowledge Spillovers with Interferences
We test for localized knowledge spillovers by comparing the geographic prox-
imity of interfering inventor pairs with a set of matched control pairs, following the 
strategy of Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993). An interfering inventor pair 
consists of two independent inventing teams declared in interference by the USPTO, 
having claims covering “the same, or substantially the same, subject matter” (35 
U.S.C. §135). A matched control pair includes one of the interfering applications 
and one control issued patent matched on technology class and application date 
(within 180 days of the application date of the interfering application). The idea 
is that inventors of the control patent likely face a similar location choice prob-
lem compared with interfering inventors. By comparing the geographic localization 
of interfering inventors with this counterfactual, we hope to control for all factors 
except common knowledge inputs.5
Consider the following  reduced-form model describing the relationship between 
shared knowledge, location, and interference. The probability of interference  Pr(in t i ) 
between a pair of inventors  i depends on their shared knowledge inputs  A i , observ-
able factors  X i , and an unobservable factor  n i :
(1)  Pr (in t i ) = g ( A i ,  X i ,  n i ) .
The degree of knowledge inputs shared by an inventor pair is a function of the geo-
graphic distance between them,  dis t i , and an unobservable factor  e i :
(2)  A i = f (dis t i ,  e i ) .
3 Conversely, like citations, interferences are an indirect measure of shared knowledge inputs. Our contribution 
is that interferences seem likely to be generated in a very different manner compared with citations, providing 
important complementary evidence on the localization of knowledge spillovers.
4 One could also  reinterpret the meaning of patent citations in a similar manner: instead of representing a direct 
spillover from the cited to the citing inventor, a citation is more likely when the citing inventor is more likely to learn 
about the cited patent from local ties. 
5 As Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) notes, this may be a conservative estimate in the sense that only 
the concentration in excess of the control pairs is attributed to localized knowledge spillovers. However, if matched 
control pairs do not adequately control for unobserved factors (other than knowledge spillovers) affecting the geog-
raphy of invention, then our estimate of knowledge spillovers will be biased upward.
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We compare the proximity of interfering pairs with that of control pairs. This will 
identify localized knowledge spillovers under two assumptions. First, interferences 
must be more likely to be declared between patents whose inventors have more 
knowledge inputs in common—that is,  g must be monotonically increasing in  A i . 
This assumption follows from the logic that new ideas result from combinations of 
existing ideas, and inventors who make the same discovery must therefore share 
the same knowledge inputs. Second, the matched control pairs must fully account 
for other factors besides localized knowledge spillovers affecting the geography of 
interference. That is,  n i must be independent of  dis t i . Under these assumptions, a 
positive correlation between interference and proximity (conditioned on observed 
factors  X i ) is evidence of localized knowledge spillovers.
First, we use  nonparametric,  distance-based methods (Duranton and Overman 
2005, Murata et al. 2014) to test for localized knowledge spillovers. We compute 
distances between interfering inventor pairs to overcome scale and border problems. 
Then, we compare the distribution of the distances between interfering inventor 
pairs to a counterfactual distribution of distances between control inventor pairs. We 
construct confidence intervals to test for significant differences between the local-
ization of interfering and control pairs. This analysis is described in Section III.
Second, we use a linear probability model that compares the probability of 
interference between patent pairs above and below different  colocation thresh-
olds. The linear probability models we estimate can be motivated by assuming that 
equations (1) and (2) are linear in their arguments. This analysis is described in 
Section IV.
A central concern is that control pairs of patents may imperfectly capture unob-
servable factors. This is the subject of the citation analysis in Thompson and 
 Fox-Kean (2005), which shows that geographic matching results following Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) are sensitive to matching on technological clas-
sification. In particular, conditioning matched control patents on ( six-digit) technol-
ogy subclass, the finest detail available in the US patent classification, rather than 
the  three-digit technology class in Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), shows 
little localization of citations compared with control pairs.6
A useful set of results comes from Murata et al. (2014). First, the degree of local-
ization of citations appears to be considerably understated by the geographic match-
ing tests of Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) and Thompson and  Fox-Kean 
(2005). Murata et al. (2014) shows that a  distance-based test shows localization of 
patent citations, even when selecting matched controls of  six-digit subclasses. The 
reason that  geographic matching tests understate the localization of citations is that 
aggregating inventor locations to metropolitan areas and states introduces border 
and scale problems. Border problems arise because counties, the basis of metropol-
itan areas, may split clusters of inventors. This tends to bias downward measures 
6 Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) notes considerable uncertainty in the “right” way to select matched 
controls, whether at the  three-digit class level (with about 450 classifications) or the  six-digit subclass level (with 
about 150,000 subclasses). While  six-digit technology classifications are quite detailed (Thompson and  Fox-Kean 
(2005) notes that the  three-digit class “231—Whips and whip apparatus” contains seven distinct subclasses), 
Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) counters that there is little evidence suggesting that selecting on  six-digit 
subclasses achieves “closer” technologically matched controls.
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of localization, since inventors split by a county boundary will not be localized by 
a commuting zone measure. Scale problems arise because aggregating the data to 
metropolitan areas or commuting zones allows analysis at only one spatial scale. 
Since commuting zones vary from very small to very large in area, analyses based 
on commuting zones mix different spatial scales. Thus, the sensitivity of the results 
on the localization of citations appears to be dwarfed by the (opposite) bias intro-
duced by spatial aggregation. Murata et al. (2014) performs a sensitivity analysis 
following Rosenbaum (2002) to bound the degree of bias in the presence of unob-
served factors affecting localization. Murata et al. (2014) finds that biases from such 
unobserved factors would have to be extremely large before reversing the conclu-
sion that patent citations are geographically localized.
Aside from concerns about imperfect controls, one might also be concerned that 
as inventions become more technologically similar (in “idea space”), other sources 
of agglomeration economies—say, labor pooling—might also become stronger. If 
this were true, even a “perfect” control patent would be unable to distinguish local-
ized knowledge spillovers from other factors.7 This is because the “idea similarity” 
between interfering inventors reflects not only shared knowledge inputs but also 
greater similarity in other inputs. For example, if there are more potential employ-
ees who know about the details of reprogramming yeast cell reproduction in San 
Francisco, then inventors who want to reprogram yeast cells and are concerned 
about insuring against the idiosyncratic risk of losing an employee will be more 
likely to locate in San Francisco.
On the other hand, localized knowledge spillovers may still be identified by using 
a  matched control approach if the “transportation cost” of ideas exceeds that of other 
factors. Suppose the strength of knowledge spillovers declines swiftly with dis-
tance—chance meetings or casual conversations with social ties are much less likely 
even at modest distances (Allen 1984, Arzaghi and Henderson 2008)—but labor 
pooling benefits are realized across neighboring counties within the same commut-
ing zone. In other words, the transportation cost of ideas—particularly tacit knowl-
edge—is higher compared with the cost of transporting workers, i.e., commuting, 
or the cost of transporting other factors (Rosenthal and Strange 2001). Firms that 
benefit from both localized knowledge spillovers and labor pooling will be more 
likely to  colocate in the same office park or neighborhood compared with two firms 
that benefit only from labor pooling and not from localized knowledge spillovers.
II. Data
A. Patent Interferences: Background
Patent interferences were a unique feature of US patent law. Through March 16, 
2013, the United States had a “first to invent” rule for assigning priority of invention, 
versus the “first to file” rule that is more common in the rest of the world and that 
prevails in the United States today. When the USPTO received patent applications 
7 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this issue.
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from multiple independent parties with one or more identical claims at roughly the 
same time, it was obliged to investigate and determine which party was entitled to 
patent protection. This investigation was known as a patent interference. A rotating 
 three-judge panel from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (hereafter the 
Board) decided who was first to invent, meaning both (i) who first had the idea (con-
ception) and (ii) who first put the idea into workable form (reduction to practice). 
Typically, parties submitted dated laboratory notebooks, testimony by associates, 
and media reports as evidence of first invention.8 Many interferences involved valu-
able inventions.9
Interferences are distinct from patent infringements. First, an interference was 
suggested by a patent examiner, a specialist in a particular technological area, 
during their routine search for prior art, when at least two US patent applications 
(or one patent application and a  recently issued patent) contained the “same patent-
able invention” (37 C.F.R. §1.601).10 The patent examiner would then forward the 
patent application and a memorandum to the Board, which would declare the patent 
interference. This is distinct from a patent infringement, in which the holder of an 
existing patent sues an infringing party.11 Second, interferences must involve parties 
with nearly simultaneous pending applications for patents.12 This feature makes 
interferences distinct from patent infringements, which typically involve leaders and 
followers.
B. Database of Interfering Inventor Pairs
We constructed a database of patent interference cases for our analysis. Our 
database starts with information from 1,329 interference decisions issued by the 
8 More details about the patent interference proceedings can be found in Calvert (1980); Calvert and Sofocleous 
(1982); Cohen and Ishii (2006); De Simone, Gambrell, and Gareau (1963); and Kingston (2004). Lin (2014) 
reviews this literature and provides summary statistics for the patent interferences used in this study.
9 A recent interference case decided in February 2017 involved patent rights to the CRISPR  gene-editing tech-
nique. (The decision date puts the case outside our sample.) In that decision, the Board found no interference in 
fact—the inventions claimed by the competing inventors, assigned to the Broad Institute and the University of 
California, were separate and did not overlap. The validity of the Broad patents was a “surprise” to researchers 
in the field; as a sign of the value of the invention, the stock of the licensee to the Broad patents went up sharply 
following the decision (Pollack 2017).
10 Alternatively, an examiner could suggest an interference when “the subject matter of a claim of one party 
would, if prior art, have anticipated or rendered obvious the subject matter of a claim of the opposing party and vice 
versa” (37 C.F.R. §41.203).
11 In some cases, a patent applicant could suggest a possible interference, but private parties could not sue for 
an interference.
12 The claim(s) of invention must have satisfied standard patentability rules—i.e., the claims must have been in a 
 patent-eligible class, useful, novel, and  nonobvious. In addition, the USPTO required that a timing rule be satisfied 
in order to avoid interferences resulting from the disclosure of patent applications themselves (i.e., publicized patent 
applications leading to copycat inventions). Thus, in the case of two or more interfering applications, the dates of 
application must have been no more than three months apart. In the case of an interfering issued patent and pending 
application, (i) the application’s date must have been more than one year before the patent’s grant date, and (ii) the 
application’s date must have been no less than three months after the patent’s application date. Specifically, interfer-
ing claims among pending applications must be made within one year of each other (35 U.S.C. §135.b.2). In cases 
where an application’s claims interfere with an  already-issued patent, the claims must be made no later than one 
year prior to the patent’s issue date (35 U.S.C. §135.b.1), and typically no later than three months after the patent’s 
original application date (37 C.F.R. §1.608). 
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Board between 1998 and 2014.13 These decisions were downloaded from the 
Board’s “ e-FOIA Reading Room” (USPTO 1998-2014). From each decision, we 
record information about the case, the parties, the application(s) and/or patent(s), 
the claims, and the inventors.14 A typical decision reports the names of the inter-
fering inventors and assignees, the associated patent and application numbers, and 
the decision on priority at the claim level or other disposition of the case. We also 
collect additional details on the cases and inventors from the USPTO’s “eFile” 
(USPTO 2000–2014) site or the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) 
service (USPTO 1985–2011). The eFile site sometimes contains notices of settle-
ment agreements.15 See online Appendix A for more details.
Several features of interference practice allow us to rule out alternative explana-
tions, outside of shared knowledge inputs. First, interferences between parties with 
common ownership interests were not allowed. Thus, they seem unlikely to result 
from other shared factors or from  within-firm spillovers. Second, the Board might 
decide that there was no interference in fact. This helps us to distinguish between 
identical inventions and near misses.16 Third, interferences seem unlikely to result 
from intentional delay in disclosing an invention. According to interference rules, 
an interfering inventor would lose priority if the inventor had not immediately filed 
for a patent application following conception and reduction to practice.17 The dis-
closure of the timeline of invention was the primary purpose of the interference 
proceeding. The alternative to admitting an intentional delay in applying for a patent 
would be conceding a later date for reduction to practice, weakening the case for 
priority.18 Fourth, if one party’s application was derived—i.e., one inventor’s claims 
13 There are a few decisions related to interferences declared well before 1998, as far back as the early 1980s, 
including a famous case over the method of producing the hepatitis B antigen. On average, however, the lag between 
interference declaration and decision dates is a few years. See Calvert and Sofocleous (1982, 1986, 1989, 1992, 
1995).
14 Note the following: (i) each case is argued between two or more parties; (ii) each party may have one or 
more inventors; (iii) each party may also have one or more applications and/or patents in interference; (iv) each 
application or patent makes one or more claims; (v) one or more of these claims are declared by the examiner to 
be in interference.
15 Normally, details of these agreements were kept secret. These notices acknowledge the existence of a settle-
ment agreement, as opposed to a decision on priority or some other outcome. Unfortunately, settlement agreements 
are sealed. Thus, we can note their existence, but we cannot analyze their contents.
16 Interferences appear to involve similar inventive claims, based on the counts declared by the Board and 
the corresponding claims of invention in interfering applications. In online Appendix B, we show that interfering 
applications overlap substantially in their inventive claims. On average, over  three-quarters of a party’s applica-
tion claims are found to be in interference. Further, partial decisions are rare. Typically, the interfering claims are 
awarded entirely to one party or the other. Thus, contra Schmookler (1966), interferences can identify identical 
inventions, versus near misses.
17 Cohen and Ishii (2006) argues that interferences correspond to an  incumbent–entrant game where incumbents 
decide to keep inventions secret for some period of time before filing a patent application. The requirement to 
promptly disclose an invention may have reduced the relevance of this margin as decisions went against interfering 
inventors who chose to keep their inventions secret for some time.
18 Interference cases appear to vary in terms of whether inventors are aware of each other’s efforts. In Lutzker v. 
Plet (1988), the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, affirmed that Lutzker was not entitled to a patent 
for a canapé maker, despite having established conception and reduction to practice in early 1976, since he had 
delayed disclosure and filing for a patent until late 1980. In contrast, Plet received priority by demonstrating her 
conception and reduction to practice by early 1980, with a filing date of March 3, 1980. The original decision by the 
Board cited the failure of Lutzker to show renewed activity toward disclosure “until after Plet entered the field” as 
an important factor in the judgment against him.
286 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS APRIL 2020
are directly sourced from the competing party through stealing or espionage—that 
was grounds for an adverse judgment.19
Interference cases were terminated by the judges’ decision on priority or for some 
other reason. A decision on priority meant a judgment that one party had first con-
ceived of the invention and reduced it to practice. Table 1 summarizes case dispo-
sitions for our sample. The first two columns display frequencies and the share of 
cases by disposition for our full sample. Nearly 20 percent of cases resulted in a 
judgment on priority, while nearly 60 percent of cases were conceded. Concessions 
occur when one party files a request for adverse judgment. An abandonment occurs 
when one party fails to file at some stage of the case. We code these outcomes as 
they are noted in the decisions. Absent detail in the decision, it is difficult to ascer-
tain the motivations for concessions (and we cannot rule out abandonments if failure 
to file is not mentioned). However, for the  subsample of 981 cases that we are able to 
match to documents on the eFile site, we code cases including an acknowledgment 
of settlement. In this  subsample, settlements constitute the majority of concessions 
and  one-third of all cases. We are unable to characterize the remaining conceded 
cases that have no acknowledgment of settlement or text in the decisions referring 
to a failure to file.
Most of our analysis focuses on interference cases in which the Board’s decisions 
report a settlement or judgment on priority. Shared knowledge inputs seem more 
likely in these cases compared with other case dispositions. For example, cases 
dismissed for no interference in fact seem less likely to involve exactly common 
knowledge inputs. Other dispositions were less common. About 9 percent of cases 
were dismissed because the claims were deemed unpatentable, 5 percent were dis-
missed because the interfering parties were discovered to have assigned rights to a 
common owner, e.g., a multinational firm,20 and 3 percent of cases were dismissed 
after a finding of no interference in fact.
19 Cases involving stealing or espionage could still reflect a spillover if it was a knowledge input rather than the 
complete invention that was stolen. The “derivation” judgment (see Table 1) occurred when it could be proven that 
one party completely stole the invention from the other. These judgments are very rare, so including them in the anal-
ysis does not affect our results—there is only one case with a “derivation” outcome out of the 1,329 in our database.
20 In at least one case, a merger appeared to have been caused by the pending interference.
Table 1—Sample Distribution of Interference Case Dispositions
Disposition Full sample eFile
Number of cases 1,329 981
Decision on priority 260 19.6% 19.0%
Conceded, total 781 58.8% 57.1%
 Settled — — 34.2%
 Abandoned 92 6.9% 3.5%
 All other reasons — — 19.4%
No interference in fact 46 3.5% 3.4%
Common ownership 64 4.8% 4.8%
Unpatentable 122 9.2% 11.3%
Other 56 4.2% 4.6%
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C. Database of Control Inventor Pairs
We use USPTO technology classifications and application dates to select controls. 
We obtain a list of all the technology classifications assigned to a patent from the 
USPTO’s Master Classification File (USPTO 2014). Patents are classified accord-
ing to  three-digit technology classes and six-digit subclasses. This information is 
available for all issued patents, but only for patent applications filed in 2001 and 
later. For earlier patent applications, we instead obtain classification information 
from the PAIR service, which records only a single main technology classification, 
considered the “primary classification” of that invention.
Since some interference cases involve more than two parties, our database of 
1,329 interference cases involves 1,401 interfering pairs of inventing parties.21 We 
select a set of control patents that are similar to the invention described by each par-
ty’s patent(s) or application(s) declared in interference. First, we require a control 
patent to share at least one three- or  six-digit technology classification with a party’s 
patent(s) or application(s). Second, control patents must have an application date 
within 180 days of the application date of an interfering application. We are able to 
obtain a set of suitable control patents for nearly every interfering inventor pair—
only 24 pairs lack suitable  three-digit controls and 32 pairs lack suitable  six-digit 
controls.
Next, each of these control patents is now eligible to form a control pair. A con-
trol pair matches a control patent to an interfering patent or application. Control 
patents are matched to the opposing party’s interfering application(s). This match-
ing structure is identical to that in Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993). In 
that application, cited patents are used to identify control patents. Control patents 
are then matched to citing patents. In our sample, the interfering application(s) of 
the first party are used to identify control patents. Control patents are then matched 
to the interfering application(s) of the second party. The pool of control patents 
is large. Conditioned on finding a control, the average interfering inventor pair is 
associated with 706 control patents matched on  six-digit technology class and 6,457 
controls matched on  three-digit technology class.
D. Inventor Location
We use information from patents and applications to measure the locations of 
inventors. For issued patents, we use the inventor disambiguation dataset of Lai 
et al. (2011). If an interference is decided against a party without an issued patent, 
then the losing party’s patent application is never passed for issue. In this case, the 
decisions, the notices of interference from eFile, and the PAIR database are essential 
sources of inventor location. While 75 percent of inventors are located in the Lai 
et al. (2011) database, the remaining 25 percent of inventors’ locations are recorded 
only in the decisions, eFile, or PAIR. At the case level, we are able to record inventor 
21 Twenty-four cases involve three parties, three cases involve four parties, and one case involves five indepen-
dent parties.
288 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: APPLIED ECONOMICS APRIL 2020
locations for at least one inventor in each party in 88 percent of interference cases 
and for all inventors in 85 percent of interference cases.
We compute the distance between opposing pairs of interfering or control 
inventors. We use the place of residence of inventors—the place named in the bib-
liographic description of the patent or application. Places can be large cities (e.g., 
San Francisco, California) but also can be small towns (e.g., Burlingame, California) 
or even unincorporated places. Unfortunately, the data are not detailed enough to 
describe  colocation within a place. We obtain the latitude and longitude of each 
inventor’s place of residence from the Census Gazetteer file. We then compute the 
minimum geodesic distance across all possible pairings of inventors within an inter-
fering or control pair.22
We also construct a geographic matching measure of  colocation, to provide results 
comparable to earlier work and to highlight proximity at short distances. For exam-
ple, we define variables that indicate whether an inventor pair shares the same place 
of residence and whether their places of residence are within 161 kilometers (100 
miles) of each other. By these measures we intend to capture localized interactions 
via social ties, workplace relationships, or random meetings. The  100-mile cutoff 
is comparable to a metropolitan area (used in Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 
1993) or a commuting zone (as in Autor and Dorn 2013).23 An advantage of our 
 distance-based measure compared with commuting zones is that it avoids border 
and scale problems, as described in Section I.
E. Illustrative Example
We briefly discuss one interference case to illustrate how interferences reflect shared 
knowledge inputs and how the matched control strategy works in practice. Interference 
103,435 involved competing claims of invention of an intraocular lens—a lens that is 
implanted in the eye during procedures such as cataract removal. The claims at issue 
involved the method by which haptics, side struts that hold the implanted lens in place 
inside the eye, are attached to the optic (lens). Both parties found that exposing the 
haptics to corona discharge (a plasma curtain that is created when air around a con-
ductor gets ionized) increases the strength of the bond between the haptic and the lens.
The junior party included three employees (Richard Christ, David Fencil, and 
Patricia Knight) in the research and development department at Allergan Inc., a 
pharmaceutical company located in Irvine, California.24 The senior party was Larry 
Blake, inventor and owner of the small company Pharmacia Iovision Inc., which 
22 For an interference between a party with  m  coinventors and another party with  n  coinventors, there are  mn 
pairwise combinations of inventors. We report results using the minimum pairwise distance across all of these 
pairwise combinations. We also experimented with using the median or mean distance for each interfering pair of 
parties and, following the convention of earlier work, the distance between the  first-named inventors of each patent. 
Results using alternative measures are similar to those reported in the paper.
23 On average, commuting zones are similar in size to a circle with diameter 80 miles; the largest consolidated 
statistical area (New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT-PA Combined Statistical Area) is similar in size to a circle with 
diameter 130 miles.
24 Allergan initially had an research and development focus on eye care therapies, and its flagship product is 
Botox. It purchased American Medical Optics, located in Irvine, in 1986. It was one of the largest intraocular lens 
producers at the time.
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was also located in Irvine. The Board determined that Blake had both conceived the 
invention and reduced it to practice sometime in August 1987, while the Christ team 
had conceived the invention sometime in 1985 and reduced the invention to practice 
in December 1987.25
A few aspects of the case are relevant for our analysis. These details are described 
in the Board’s decision, which was based on evidence presented during the case, 
primarily lab notebooks and eyewitness testimony.
First, both parties appear to have had common knowledge inputs that led to the 
common discovery. They were aware of the problem of attaching haptics to lenses 
and knew that corona discharge had been “used for surface treatment of plastics and 
rubber to improve adhesion.”
Second, the geographic proximity of the inventors facilitated knowledge flows. 
Most relevantly, Blake had been a  short-term consultant at Allergan between June 
1986 and April 1987. His consulting work at Allergan related to silicone lenses. 
Notably, he was not working with the Christ team, nor in a similar research area. 
Nonetheless, the decision cites testimony from Allergan employees stating that Blake 
would have been aware of the project through his physical presence at Allergan: 
“there were no secrets in the R&D Department of Allergan during the  mid-1986 
time frame and everyone shared resources.” One employee testified that the “plasma 
and corona work was being conducted in the Technology and Ventures laboratory,” 
that Blake was seen at least once in the building, and that “anyone could go in and 
out of the building freely.”
Both firms were located in Irvine, and the individual inventors lived nearby: 
Blake, Christ, and Knight lived in surrounding Orange County communities (in 
Cota de Caza, Laguna Beach, and Laguna Niguel, respectively), while Fencil lived 
in Goleta, in Santa Barbara County. (These places of residence are the locations 
recorded in their corresponding patents and applications.)
Third, examining the control patents matched to the inventions in interference 
suggests that the control inventions are quite similar to those in the dispute, but the 
inventors are geographically distant. For example, one control patent matched to the 
Christ application was filed by three inventors all living in the Minneapolis–St. Paul 
metropolitan area and working at Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company 
(3M) in St. Paul, Minnesota. The invention appears quite similar to the interfering 
patents; it is for an intraocular lens and discloses a method for fixing a haptic that 
has an anchoring filament to a lens. Another control patent matched to the Blake 
application was filed by an inventor living in Arlington, Texas, and also concerned 
attaching a haptic for an intraocular lens (titled “Method of Attaching a Haptic to an 
Optic of an Intraocular Lens”).
III.  Distance-Based and Geographic Matching Tests of Localization
We identify localized knowledge spillovers using  distance-based tests following 
Duranton and Overman (2005) and Murata et al. (2014). We compare the distribution 
25 Priority was awarded to Blake as Christ “failed to show diligence between the period just prior to August 1987 
and the reduction to practice date established for the Junior party of December 31, 1987.”
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of distances between pairs of interfering inventors with a counterfactual distribution 
of distances between pairs of control inventors. In this way, we compare the geo-
graphic distribution of interferences with the distribution that would be expected 
to occur randomly conditioned on the geography of invention represented by the 
controls.
First, we estimate the density of distances between pairs of interfering inventors. 
The distance between each interfering inventor pair  i = 1, …, I is  d i . The estimator 
of the density of pairwise distances (the kernel density) at any distance  d is
  K ˆ (d) =  1 _ 2h  ∑ i=1
I
  f  ( d −  d i  _h ) ,
where  h is the bandwidth and  f is the kernel function. All densities are computed 
using a Gaussian kernel and with the bandwidth set as in Silverman (1986).26 
Figure  1 shows the estimated density of pairwise distances between interfering 
inventors as a solid black line.
Second, we use Monte Carlo simulations to construct a counterfactual distri-
bution of pairwise distances using our sample of control pairs, test for significant 
departures from our counterfactual benchmarks, and estimate confidence intervals. 
Our simulation strategy follows Murata et al. (2014). Our analysis differs from 
Murata et al. (2014) by focusing on pairs of patents in an interference case, rather 
than  cited–citing pairs.
In each of 1,000 simulations, we randomly sample a matched control pair for 
each interfering pair from the set of permissible control pairs. With this random 
draw of control pairs, we estimate the kernel density for the distribution of pairwise 
distance. We repeat this exercise by drawing a new set of control pairs.
We evaluate significant departures from our counterfactual benchmarks by construct-
ing local confidence intervals. We consider all distances between 0 and 3,844 kilome-
ters (km), the median distance between all pairs of control and interfering inventors.27 
Comparison of the distance densities above 3,844 km is redundant because densities 
must sum to one over the entire range of distances. In other words, if the density of 
interfering pairs is lower compared with control pairs at distances greater than 3,844 
km, it must be higher compared with control pairs at distances less than 3,844 km. 
Thus, we need only examine  below-median distances to infer localization.
We rank the simulated kernel density estimates at 100 evenly spaced distances and 
select the fiftieth ranked simulated kernel density at each distance to construct the 
lower 5 percent confidence band and the  nine hundred fiftieth ranked to construct the 
upper 5 percent confidence band. These are the lower 5 percent and upper 5 percent 
confidence levels denoted by  K _ (d ) and  K –(d ) , respectively. When  K ˆ (d ) >  K –(d ) , we 
infer that interferences exhibit localization at distance  d at a 5 percent  confidence 
level. That is, interfering pairs are more likely to be  d km apart compared with 
26 To deal with boundary problems at zero due to the  nonnegative domain of distances, we use the reflection 
method of Silverman (1986), following Duranton and Overman (2005).
27 The median distance is 3,367 km for the sample of interfering and  six-digit control pairs and 3,844 km for the 
sample of interfering and  three-digit control pairs.
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control pairs. Figure 1 shows that the estimated kernel density of pairwise distances 
for interfering pairs exceeds the upper 5 percent local confidence level (dotted red 
line) for a range of distances up to about 1,000 km (620 miles). For example, since 
 K ˆ (d ) >  K –(d ) for  d = 1,000 , we infer that interfering inventor pairs are more 
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Figure 1. Interfering Pairs Are More Localized Compared with Control Pairs
Notes: These graphs compare the estimated kernel densities of geographic distances between pairs of interfering 
inventors to the distribution for similar  noninterfering control pairs. We use the minimum geodesic distance between 
the places of residence of inventors from opposite teams. The black line shows the estimated kernel density function 
for all interfering pairs for which we were able to find suitable controls. The dotted red lines show the upper and 
lower 5 percent local confidence intervals of the kernel density for  noninterfering control pairs. The dashed blue 
lines show the upper and lower 5 percent global confidence bands of the kernel density for  noninterfering control 
pairs. The estimated densities end at the median distance between inventing pairs. Interfering pairs are considered 
localized if the estimated kernel density of interfering inventors is above the upper global confidence band for at 
least one distance  d up to the sample median.
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likely (at a 5 percent confidence level) to be 1,000 km apart compared with control 
inventor pairs.
These inferences are local in the sense that they allow us to make only local state-
ments (i.e., at a given distance  d ) about the relationship between the interfering and 
counterfactual distributions. However, even if interfering pairs are distributed ran-
domly with respect to control pairs, there is a high probability that interfering pairs 
will exhibit localization at some distance, since by construction there is a 5 percent 
probability for each particular distance that a random draw of control pairs will 
exhibit localization.
We next define global confidence bands, which allow us to make statements about 
the overall location patterns of interfering inventors. We search for identical upper 
and lower confidence intervals such that when we consider them for all distances 
between 0 and 3,844 km, only 5 percent of our randomly generated simulated kernel 
densities hit them. That is, we define a global upper confidence band  K 
=(d ) as the 
band that is hit by 5 percent of our simulations between 0 and 3,844 km. Interfering 
pairs are considered globally localized (at a 5 percent confidence level) when 
 K ˆ (d ) >  K =(d ) for at least one  d ∈ [0, 3,844] . Naturally, the global confidence bands 
are wider compared with the local confidence intervals.28 Graphically, interferences 
are globally localized if the density of pairwise distances for interfering pairs is 
above the upper global confidence band for at least one distance  d up to the sample 
median. Conversely, interferences are globally dispersed if the density lies below 
the lower confidence band and never lies above the upper confidence band. Figure 1 
shows that the estimated kernel density of pairwise distances for interfering pairs 
exceeds the upper 5 percent global confidence level (dashed blue line). Thus, inter-
fering pairs of inventors are more geographically localized compared with control 
inventor pairs not linked by an interference.
These results are robust to matching on  three-digit technology class or  six-digit 
technology subclass. In panel A, we show results using  three-digit control pairs; 
in panel B, we show results using  six-digit control pairs. Thus, while the observed 
distribution of pairwise distances for interfering pairs is the same in both panels, 
the counterfactual distribution is more geographically concentrated for the  six-digit 
control pairs shown in panel B. This is consistent with Thompson and  Fox-Kean 
(2005), which shows that the localization of patent citations is sensitive to the selec-
tion of controls. However, unlike Thompson and  Fox-Kean (2005), we find that 
for either counterfactual, interferences are indeed significantly geographically local-
ized. This echoes Murata et al. (2014), which shows that the localization of patent 
citations is robust to matching on  six-digit subclasses when using a  distance-based 
test, as we are doing here. Overall, this evidence is consistent with geographic prox-
imity facilitating the sharing of common knowledge inputs.
Our results on geographic localization are robust to the choice of proximity 
measure and conditioning on decision type. Table  2 presents results separately 
for priority decisions (excluding concessions) and three different measures of 
28 In general, we end up selecting approximately the  tenth ranked simulated kernel density to construct the lower 
5 percent global confidence level and the  nine hundred ninetieth ranked simulated kernel density to construct the 
upper 5 percent global confidence level. See Duranton and Overman (2005) for more discussion.
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inventor proximity. Panel A compares the average distance between inventors in 
an interfering pair to that for control pairs, with simulated confidence intervals. 
On average, interfering pairs in priority decisions and concessions are 3,451 km 
apart, compared with 4,778 km separating  three-digit control pairs of inventors 
and 4,425 km separating  six-digit control pairs of inventors. Average distances 
separating interfering and control pairs of inventors are similar when we focus on 
priority decisions only.
Though interfering inventors are closer together on average, the average pair-
wise distances may obscure the relevant range of geographic proximity for local-
ized knowledge spillovers. Panels B and C present results that examine inventor 
 colocation or “geographic matching” as in the main tests performed in Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993). Panel B shows the share of inventor pairs that 
report the same place (e.g., a town or city) of residence. Nearly 3 percent of inter-
fering inventors share a place of residence, compared with 1 and 2 percent of three- 
and  six-digit control pairs, respectively. (The difference compared with  three-digit 
control pairs is statistically significant.)
Panel C shows the share of inventor pairs that report places of residence within 
161 kilometers (100 miles) of each other. By this measure we intend to capture local-
ized interactions via social ties, workplace relationships, or random meetings. The 
 100-mile cutoff is comparable to a metropolitan area (used in Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and 






Panel A. Average distance between pair of inventors in kilometers
Interfering pairs 3,451 3,603
Three-digit control pairs 4,778 4,714
(4,563, 4,985) (4,321, 5,122)
Six-digit control pairs 4,425 4,282
(4,219, 4,623) (3,890, 4,688)
Panel B. Share of inventor pairs with same place, town, or city of residence
Interfering pairs 2.7% 2.8%
Three-digit control pairs 0.8% 0.7%
(0.4%, 1.4%) (0.0%, 1.8%)
Six-digit control pairs 2.0% 2.0%
(1.3%, 2.9%) (0.7%, 3.6%)
Panel C. Share of inventor pairs with places of residence within 161 km or 100 miles
Interfering pairs 13.8% 11.7%
Three-digit control pairs 5.2% 5.2%
(4.0%, 6.4%) (3.1%, 7.6%)
Six-digit control pairs 8.2% 8.2%
(6.7%, 9.7%) (5.4%, 11.2%)
Notes: This table reports statistics for interfering and control pairs of inventing teams. Panel 
A reports the average minimum distance between places of residences of inventing teams. 
Panel B reports the share of inventor pairs that share a place of residence. Panel C reports the 
share of inventor pairs where the minimum distance between places of residence is within 
161 km. Simulated upper and lower 5 percent confidence intervals for control pairs are shown 
in parentheses.
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Henderson 1993) or a commuting zone (as in Autor and Dorn 2013).29 As described 
in Section  I, we prefer to use this  distance-based cutoff as opposed to explicitly 
calculating commuting zone matches, because it avoids border and scale problems. 
Thus, this test is similar to the original  matching-rate tests at the metropolitan area 
level reported in Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), except that we leverage 
the  microgeography of inventor location compared with  colocating within the same 
county or set of counties.
Between 12 and 14 percent of interfering inventor pairs are within 161 km 
(100 miles), compared with 5 to 8 percent of control inventor pairs. These differ-
ences are significant. In sum, interfering inventor pairs are 1.4 to 4.0 times more 
likely to locate in the same place or region compared with control inventor pairs.
In online Appendix C, we show additional results comparing interfering inventor 
pairs with control pairs. We provide evidence of shared knowledge inputs among 
interfering and control pairs. Interfering pairs are more likely to share technology 
classifications and backward citations. These results connect interferences to more 
familiar measures of shared knowledge. They also motivate our next analysis condi-
tioning on additional controls.
IV.  Interference-Rate Regressions
The result that interfering inventors are more localized compared with control 
inventors is also robust to conditioning on bibliometric measures of pairwise sim-
ilarity. To show this, we assume that equations (1) and (2) are linear in their argu-
ments and estimate30
(3)  Pr (in t i [g]  ) =  μ g +  β 1 f (distanc e i ) +  X i  β X +  ε i .
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether an inventor pair is involved 
in an interference. The regressions are run on the entire sample of interfering pairs 
and matched controls. All specifications include a fixed effect for each “pair group” 
indexed by  g , defined by an interfering inventor pair and all associated matched 
control pairs. Thus, the effect of  colocation on interference is identified by variation 
within the group of an interfering pair and its associated control pairs. We cluster 
standard errors at the  pair-group level.
We use several measures of the proximity of inventor pairs, following the results 
reported in Table 2: (i) the logarithm of distance between pairs of inventor teams, 
29 On average, commuting zones are similar in size to a circle with diameter 80 miles; the largest consolidated 
statistical area (New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT-PA Combined Statistical Area) is similar in size to a circle with 
diameter 130 miles.
30 This equation illustrates that the effect of distance on interference based on a naïve comparison between 
interfering pairs and  arbitrarily chosen patent pairs will be biased if omitted factor  η i , which affects the probability 
of interference, is correlated with the distance between the pair of inventors. Ideally, the  matched control estimator 
can still identify  β 1 , the effect of distance on interference. To see this, take expectations and note that by assumption 
 E(ϵ | IC ) = 0 . That is, conditioned on the sample of interfering and control pairs  IC , the expected effect of unob-
served factors on interference is zero. However, to the extent that matched controls do not satisfy this condition, 
then estimates of  β ˆ 1 will still be biased. In other words, perhaps the matched controls are “not similar enough,” and 
therefore, the identifying assumption is not satisfied.
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(ii) an indicator equal to 1 when the minimum distance between an inventor pair 
is within 1.6 km (1 mile), and (iii) an indicator equal to 1 when the minimum dis-
tance between the locations of residence reported by an interfering or control pair is 
within 161 km (100 miles).
Estimates are reported in Table 3. For each combination of sample (interfering 
pairs plus three- or  six-digit control pairs) and proximity measure, we show two spec-
ifications. The first, in columns 1 and 3, reports the univariate relationship between 
inventor pair distance and interference. The second, in columns 2 and 4, reports con-
Table 3—Robustness of Colocation Effect on Interference
Three-digit controls Six-digit controls
µ [σ] (1) (2) µ [σ] (3) (4)
Panel A. Distance between pair of inventors
log distance 8.386 −0.008 −0.006 8.171 −0.041 −0.033
[1.752] (0.001) (0.001) [1.925] (0.007) (0.007)
Number of shared classes 0.812 −0.012 1.141 0.008
[0.662] (0.003) [0.844] (0.022)
Number of shared subclasses 0.130 0.166 0.788 0.286
[0.502] (0.015) [1.078] (0.033)
Number of shared citations 0.011 0.099 0.056 0.130
[0.631] (0.057) [1.676] (0.096)
Panel B. Colocation with same place, town, or city of residence
1(Colocated in same place) 0.009 0.060 0.014 0.014 0.115 −0.042
[0.092] (0.020) (0.023) [0.118] (0.112) (0.126)
Number of shared classes 0.812 −0.012 1.141 0.007
[0.662] (0.003) [0.844] (0.022)
Number of shared subclasses 0.130 0.167 0.788 0.289
[0.502] (0.015) [1.078] (0.033)
Number of shared citations 0.011 0.100 0.056 0.131
[0.631] (0.057) [1.676] (0.097)
Panel C. Colocation with places of residence within 161 km (100 miles)
1(Colocated within 161 km) 0.057 0.043 0.030 0.077 0.206 0.156
[0.232] (0.007) (0.007) [0.266] (0.048) (0.048)
Number of shared classes 0.812 −0.012 1.141 0.007
[0.662] (0.003) [0.844] (0.022)
Number of shared subclasses 0.130 0.166 0.788 0.287
[0.502] (0.015) [1.078] (0.033)
Number of shared citations 0.011 0.099 0.056 0.131
[0.631] (0.057) [1.676] (0.096)
Pairs 5,712,342 5,712,342 5,712,342 604,828 604,828 604,828
Pair groups 831 831 821 821
Notes: This table shows estimates from a regression of an indicator for interference on a measure of proximity and 
controls. The sample includes interfering pairs of inventing teams and three- or six-digit controls, as indicated by 
the column group heading. The dependent variable is an indicator for interference ×100, with mean 0.04 percent 
in the sample with three-digit controls and mean 0.4 percent in the sample with six-digit controls. Sample means 
and standard  deviations are reported in the columns labeled µ[σ]. Panel A reports estimates where the measure of 
proximity is the minimum log distance between the pair of inventing teams. Panel B reports estimates where the 
measure of proximity is an indicator for whether the pair of inventing teams is colocated in the same place, town, 
or city of residence. Panel C reports estimates where the measure of proximity is an indicator for whether the pair 
of inventing teams is colocated with places of residences within 161 km (100 miles).  Standard errors, clustered 
on pair groups, are reported in parentheses. The number of observations reported in the bottom panel applies to all 
regressions in that column.
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ditional estimates, controlling for three measures of bibliometric similarity: (i) the 
number of technological classes shared by the pair of inventors, (ii) the number sub-
classes shared by the pair of inventors, and (iii) the number of backward citations to 
prior art shared by the pair of inventors. Recall that we match controls based only on 
a single shared ( three-digit) class or ( six-digit) subclass. Including controls for addi-
tional shared classes and subclasses conditions our estimate of the effect of distance 
on even more similar inventions—that is, those pairs that share similar numbers of 
classifications. Similarly, including controls for the number of backward citations 
conditions our estimates on pairs of inventions that probably, by evidence of citing 
the same prior art, are technologically quite similar.
Proximity leads to a higher likelihood of interference, as suggested by the estimates 
in panel A. In the sample of  three-digit matched control pairs and interferences, a 
doubling of the minimum distance between a pair of inventor teams decreases the 
probability of interference by 0.008 percent (column 1), compared with the mean 
probability of interference of 0.04 percent. In the sample of  six-digit matched control 
pairs and interferences, a doubling of the minimum distance between a pair of inventor 
teams decreases the probability of interference by 0.04 percent (column 3), compared 
with the mean probability of interference of 0.4 percent. Similarly, in panels B and C, 
 colocation in the same place of residence or with places of residence within 161 km 
increases the likelihood of interference by 0.06 percent and 0.04 percent, respectively, 
compared with  three-digit control pairs. These effects are precisely estimated.
Columns 2 and 4 add bibliometric controls measuring  patent-pair similarity. We 
control for the number of shared technology ( three-digit) classes, the number of 
shared ( six-digit) subclasses, and the number of shared backward citations to prior art. 
Most of the estimates of the effect of proximity on interference are robust to the inclu-
sion of these controls and are precisely estimated. The effect of distance attenuates by 
about  one-quarter when controlling for our measures of  patent-pair similarity (panel 
A). Similarly, the effect of  colocation within 161 km attenuates by about  one-quarter 
when including controls (panel C). These results suggest that, at least to the extent that 
we are able to introduce additional controls for factors contributing to the geography 
of invention, our results do not seem to be driven by imperfectly matched controls.
The effect of  colocation in the same city, town, or place (panel B) attenuates more 
when controlling for shared classes and citations but is estimated imprecisely. One 
explanation may be that geographic proximity may be imprecisely measured using 
place of residence. One might want to use place of work or other places where inven-
tors might be exposed to localized knowledge spillovers. However, we observe only 
place of residence. Relatedly, we also note that place of residence may refer to a very 
small spatial scale: a suburban town or village, or even an unincorporated community. 
At this spatial scale, other factors such as local amenities may contribute more to the 
sorting of inventors to places compared with localized knowledge spillovers. Finally, 
as discussed above, the  colocation results are subject to bias related to spatial aggrega-
tion. For these reasons, we place more weight on the  distance-based results in panel A 
or the  colocation results at the spatial scale of a commuting zone in panel C.
Finally, we note that geography appears to contribute to interference over and 
above the number of shared citations. If all knowledge spillovers were recorded 
in citations, then controlling for citations should remove the effect of distance on 
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interferences. Instead, our results suggest that proximity matters for localized spill-
overs of knowledge not recorded in citations, or tacit knowledge. We further explore 
this idea in the next section.
V. Comparison with  Citation-Linked Inventors
Are spillovers of tacit knowledge more localized than other forms of knowledge 
that are more easily codified? The results in Arzaghi and Henderson (2008) suggest 
that the external benefits to advertising agencies in Manhattan attenuate quickly 
over space—they dissipate in as little as 750 meters. To the extent that interferences 
can capture spillovers of both tacit and codified knowledge, their localization could 
provide evidence that tacit knowledge spillovers require even closer proximity. To 
test this hypothesis, we compare the observed distribution of geographic proxim-
ity between interfering inventors to pairs of control patents and interfering patents 
linked by citation. Thus, our control pairs in this exercise are the treated pairs in 
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993). As  citation-linked patents have been used 
extensively following Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) as evidence them-
selves of knowledge spillovers, we view these controls as a particularly strong coun-
terfactual. For each interfering pair, we identify potential controls as patents cited by 
one of the interfering parties. Then, we form  cited–citing control pairs by matching 
an interfering application to one of the these cited control patents.
This exercise also suggests that our main result is robust to matching controls on 
other factors. Here, matched control patents are selected on the basis of citation links, 
rather than technology class and date of invention as in the main analysis presented in 
Section III.  Citation-linked patents seem even more likely to share similar production 
and demand factors, in addition to shared knowledge as measured by citations.
Figure 2 shows the comparison between interfering inventor pairs and  cited–citing 
control pairs. The black line again shows the observed density of pairwise distances 
between interfering inventors. (This is the same density reported in Figure 1, except 
for the change in sample to interferences with eligible  citation-linked controls.) The 
dotted red and dashed blue lines show local confidence intervals and global confidence 
bands, respectively, for the density of pairwise distances between  cited–citing con-
trol pairs. Even compared against the geography of  citation-linked patents, interfering 
patents are significantly more localized. A natural interpretation is that forms of input 
knowledge not captured easily by citations—perhaps tacit knowledge—contribute to 
the localization of patent interferences over that of patent citations. Thus, this result is 
consistent with the Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) conjecture that citations 
are a lower bound on the strength of localized knowledge spillovers.
VI. Localization and  Coinventor Ties
How is localized knowledge transmitted? Recent work suggests that network ties 
mediate the relationship between geographic proximity and localized knowledge spill-
overs. Social and professional ties may be especially important for the transmission of 
tacit knowledge. For example, Breschi and Lissoni (2009) uses past  coinventorship 
as recorded on US patents as a measure of social ties. They found that controlling 
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for this measure greatly reduced estimates of the effect of geographic localization on 
citations. More recently, Head, Li, and Minondo (forthcoming) finds that controlling 
for measures of the network ties among mathematicians halves the estimated effect 
of geographic distance on citations.
To shed light on the role of social ties in mediating the relationship between local-
ization and interference, we follow Breschi and Lissoni (2009) and consider previ-
ous  coinventorship as a proxy for social ties. We use the Lai et al. (2011) database 
of inventors of US patents to construct measures of ties. We define a network with 
each inventor represented as a node and connections or edges between any inventors 
that have been  coinventors on an issued patent. (Unique inventors are identified 
with name disambiguation, available in the Lai et al. (2011) database. The Lai et al. 
(2011) algorithm uses not only name similarity but also inventor location, assignee, 
and technological class information.) The network distance between two inventors 
is the minimum path distance between them in the network—the number of edges 
along the shortest path from one inventor node to the other. This network distance 
is conditioned on  coinventor links up to five years before the earliest application 
date in interference. For a pair of patents A and B, we assign the shortest network 
distance between any inventor on patent A and any inventor on patent B.
An important limitation of this database is that it includes only information 
about  coinventor ties from issued US patents. We are unable to include  interfering 
inventors without an issued patent—about  one-quarter of inventors—in this analy-
sis because they do not appear in the Lai et al. (2011) database. Further, social and 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Geographic Distances versus  Citation-Linked Controls
Notes: This graph compares the estimated kernel densities of geographic distances between pairs of interfering inven-
tors to the distribution for control pairs that include one interfering patent and one patent cited by the interfering pat-
ent. We use the minimum geodesic distance between the places of residence of inventors from opposite teams. The 
black line shows the estimated kernel density function for all interfering pairs for which we were able to find suitable 
controls. The dotted red lines show the upper and lower 5 percent local confidence intervals of the kernel density for 
 noninterfering control pairs. The dashed blue lines show the upper and lower 5 percent global confidence bands of 
the kernel density for  noninterfering control pairs. Control patents are restricted to backward citations from one of the 
interfering patents. Interfering pairs are considered localized if the estimated kernel density of interfering inventors is 
above the upper global confidence band for at least one distance  d up to the sample median.
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Interfering inventor pairs are more than twice as likely to be connected by pre-
vious  coinventor ties. Over  two-fifths of interfering inventor pairs are connected by 
previous  coinventor ties, compared with about  one-fifth of control inventor pairs.31 
This result confirms the findings of earlier studies suggesting that social and profes-
sional ties are important for facilitating knowledge flows.
However, we find only modest evidence that the localization of interfering 
inventors is accounted for by previous  coinventor ties. Table  4 shows the result 
of  interference-rate regressions conditioned on  coinventor ties. Compared with 
Table 3, there are two more controls: (i) an indicator if two inventing teams are 
not connected by a previous  coinventor tie ( 1(Network | observed ) = 0 ) and 
(ii) an indicator if two inventing teams are connected by a previous  coinventor tie 
( 1(Network | observed ) = 1 ). Unobserved network ties (for inventors outside the 
Lai et al. (2011) database) are the omitted category. Column 1 repeats estimates 
displayed in Table 3, column 3, for comparison. Columns 2–3 condition on previous 
 coinventor ties. Column 3 adds controls for  patent-pair similarity as introduced in 
Table 3, column 4.
A few patterns stand out. One, there appears to be an interference premium for 
those connected by previous  coinventor ties compared with those who are not. The 
estimates in columns 2–3 of both panels suggest that pairs connected by previous 
 coinventor ties are about 0.06–0.07 percent more likely to be in interference com-
pared with pairs not connected by previous  coinventor ties. This gap is robust to 
measures of geographic proximity and additional controls for patent-pair similarity.
Two, pairs for which network information is not observed are much more likely 
to be in interference, by about 0.5–0.6 percent. This pattern is accounted for by the 
fact that we do not observe network information for inventing parties who do not 
have an issued patent. Because control patents are selected on the basis of having an 
issued patent, by construction, only the network information for interfering inven-
tors is censored.
Three, the estimated effect of proximity does not change when we condition on 
observed  coinventor ties. In contrast to Breschi and Lissoni (2005), we find little 
evidence that the localization of interfering inventors is mediated via social ties, at 
least as proxied by previous  coinventor ties. These regression results suggest that 
this measure of social ties is independent of geographic localization. Of course, it is 
worth reiterating that an important limitation is that we do not observe other ties not 
captured by  coinventorship on US patents. For only about  two-thirds of the sample 
do we observe  coinventor ties, so part of the effect of log distance is identified by the 
 one-third of the sample for which we do not observe  coinventor ties.
VII. Conclusions
We present new evidence of localized knowledge spillovers using a novel data-
base of patent interferences—instances of simultaneous, identical invention by mul-
tiple independent parties. By evidence of common, identical invention, interfering 
31 See online Appendix D.
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inventors share common knowledge inputs. Interfering inventor pairs show signif-
icant geographic localization compared with the counterfactual of inventor pairs 
sharing similar invention dates and technology classification. Thus, our results 
provide verification of the existence of localized knowledge spillovers and are 
distinct from the literature using patent citations. Interfering inventor pairs are 
even more localized compared with  cited–citing inventor pairs, consistent with the 
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) conjecture that citations are a lower bound 
on the strength of localized knowledge spillovers.
Our results suggest that, in contrast to conventional wisdom about “the death 
of distance,” geographic distance continues to matter, especially for flows of tacit, 
or  difficult-to-codify, forms of knowledge. These are the types of knowledge 
Table 4—Colocation and Coinventor Ties
µ [σ] (1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Distance between pair of inventors
log distance 8.171 −0.041 −0.040 −0.032
[1.925] (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Number of shared classes 1.141 0.032
[0.844] (0.023)
Number of shared subclasses 0.788 0.292
[1.078] (0.034)
Number of shared citations 0.056 0.132
[1.676] (0.096)
1(Network | observed) = 0 0.318 −0.539 −0.634
[0.466] (0.085) (0.104)
1(Network | observed) = 1 0.326 −0.471 −0.585
[0.469] (0.082)  (0.103)
 R 2 0.065 0.066 0.070
Pairs 604,828 604,828 604,828 604,828
Pair groups 821 821 821
Panel B. Colocation with places of residence within 161 km (100 miles)
1(Colocated within 161 km) 0.077 0.206 0.195 0.146
[0.266] (0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
Number of shared classes 1.141 0.031
[0.844] (0.023)
Number of shared subclasses 0.788 0.293
[1.078] (0.034)
Number of shared citations 0.056 0.132
[1.676] (0.096)
1(Network | observed) = 0 0.318 −0.543 −0.637
[0.466] (0.085) (0.104)
1(Network | observed) = 1 0.326 −0.466 −0.582
[0.469]  (0.082)  (0.104)
R2 0.065 0.066 0.070
Pairs 604,828 604,828 604,828 604,828
Pair groups 821 821 821
Notes: This table shows estimates from a regression of an indicator for interference on a measure of proximity and 
controls. The sample includes interfering pairs of inventing teams and six-digit controls. The dependent variable is 
an indicator for interference ×100, with mean 0.4 percent. Sample means and standard deviations are reported in 
the column labeled µ[σ]. Panel A reports estimates where the measure of proximity is the minimum log distance 
between the pair of inventing teams. Panel B reports estimates where the measure of proximity is an indicator for 
whether the pair of inventing teams is colocated with places of residences within 161 km (100 miles). Standard 
errors, clustered on pair groups, are reported in parentheses.
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flows where the lack of a “paper trail” has hampered the availability of evidence. 
Interferences therefore provide a unique and useful window into localized knowl-
edge spillovers. In future work, it would be useful to leverage the potential of inter-
ferences to measure shared knowledge inputs to investigate other features of the 
invention process.
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